Truman Committee of World War II
The Senate Investigation of the National Defense Program
Sep 4, 2009
The build-up of America's national defense in 1941 was fast and furious. More than $10 billion were awarded through defense contracts and a plethora of war agencies were created to manage it. But it was mismanaged. When senator Truman visited Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri after receiving complaints of waste and profiteering, he found idle workers being paid, expensive equipment and supplies deteriorating, and the contractor working on a cost-plus basis.
Cost-Plus Contracts
Truman's proposal of a special senate committee to investigate defense spending and production was approved and it went to work by April 1941. Dubbed the "Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program," it first looked into the building of camps. The committee went on a cross-country tour and found more examples of cost-plus contracts offering guaranteed fixed profits for the builder.
The committee uncovered plenty of profiteering. For example, the original building cost of Camp Wallace in Texas was $480,000. It ended up costing $2,539,000. In renting trucks and equipment, the committee found that the Army wasted $13 million by not buying outright. Also discovered was that contractors were earning in a few months 3-4 times what they would make in a year.
Curtis-Wright, Glenn Martin, and Carnegie-Illinois
Negligence and falsification were unearthed in defense production. The Curtis-Wright firm allowed faulty airplane engines to be installed. The Army Air Corps denied there were problems, but an Air Corps general was sent to prison because of the committee's findings. Also, it was found that the Glenn Martin Company was making B-26 Bombers with wings not wide enough. Production was too far along to make corrections, according to Martin.
At the Irvin works, a Carnegie-Illinois rolling mill in West Mifflin Pennsylvania, the committee discovered at least 5% (3,000 tons per month) of the production did not meet Navy specifications and was recorded as up to standard. Assistant Metallurgist David B. Ireland Jr., at the Carnegie-Illinois mill in Pittsburgh, admitted that he could readily fool the Navy inspector on steel quality tests.
"Dollar-a-Year Men"
Another problem Truman saw in war production was the advent of the "dollar-a-year men." These were corporate executives who took government positions but maintained their old corporate salaries. Truman complained to War Production Board head Donald Nelson, concerned that these executives might hesitate on orders that might harm their companies and post-war profits. Nelson defended the system- the executives still had expensive mortgages and insurance to pay. Truman respectfully backed off.
Also preying on Truman's mind, according to historian David McCullough, was the need for civilian control over the expanding military-industrial complex. Truman frequently saw ambitious generals and admirals gaining influence over industry in his investigations. With $400 billion more in military contracts added in the first half of 1942 and construction of the huge Pentagon under way, Truman was seeing a shift in the nation's direction.
The Truman Committee saved the country money and lives. Its investigations eventually acted as a deterrent against fraud, negligence, and profiteering. General Brehon B. Somerville credited the committee for saving $250 million on camp building alone. Some have estimated the committee saved as much as $15 billion total and thousands of lives.
Source:
McCullough, David, Truman, Touchstone: New York, 1992.
