Iraq and American Politics
American Political Parties Fail to Craft Basic Policy Agreement
U. S. policy in Iraq is consistent with the strategy against terror that Congress endorsed, but most Democrats have simply ignored that.
Ten days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and the American people. In that speech, he laid out his basic strategy in his War On Terror. His objectives from the start went beyond destroying Al Qaeada and breaking the Taliban's grip on power in Afghanistan. Mr. Bush stated clearly, even bluntly, that anyone who aided terrorists would be seen by the United States as responsible for the acts of those terrorists. He specifically included national governments.
That is the fundamental rationale for the war in Iraq. Saddam had nothing to do with 9/11, and he likely had no use for Al Qaeada, but to say Saddam did not support terrorism stretches the point. He did give money, openly and proudly, to the families of suicide bombers. He had ties to Hezbollah. Saddam's whole career made clear he would do whatever he thought he could get away with. President Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq, with the voted support of Congress, pursuant to his publicly stated strategy against terror.
Virtually from the beginning of the Iraq War, however, a split in U. S. national leadership was apparent. The President and most Republicans talked in terms of winning in Iraq, whereas most Democrats seemed focused on when American forces could be brought home. As the war dragged on and events didn't follow American expectations, the Democratic anti-war position hardened, and gained supporters. In the 2006 congressional elections, the Democrats took control of both houses, largely based on the party's position against Iraq.
The basic problem with U. S. Iraq policy is that the two ruling parties never really agreed on one. Democrats tend to argue that since Al Qaeada attacked America, the American objective should be to destroy Al Qaeada, and that included toppling the Taliban. Dealing with broader matters, Democrats seem to say, should have come later. President Bush, on the other hand, argued from the beginning that Al Qaeada was only part of a wider war against Islamic extremism, and to finally be secure the United States, and the West, had to go to the root of the problem.
Whether invading Iraq even begins to get at that root is open to question. Whether a sharp focus on a single objective, leaving bigger issues to a later time would have produced better short term results is equally questionable. There is no guarantee that a strict focus on Bin Laden would have netted Bin Laden by now; the consequences of pursuing such a single-minded strategy are equally unknowable. Today, Saddam might still be in power-- and Musharaf might not be.
The U. S. intervention in Iraq revolves around American political failure. President Bush established a policy, but failed to bring the Democrats along. The Democrats, one could argue, failed to engage in strategic thinking, deciding instead to try to score political points. The refusal of the parties to come together and govern after the nation was attacked is the real American failure.
